Use policy
Introduction
International surrogacy agreements pose complex challenges for the states involved. These include the question of what should be the nationality of children born following international surrogacy agreements (hereafter'international surrogate children'), which this article focuses upon. Take the example of a child born to a surrogate in state A, whose intended parent(s) are from state B -how is the nationality of such a child determined?
1 As this article explains, this question is often tied to who states A and B recognise as the legal parent(s). However, questions of nationality of international surrogate children, are complicated by: (i) differences in domestic provisions governing the legal parenthood of children; (ii) the absence of any overarching international framework in terms of legal parenthood; and (iii) disparities between national states on the legality of surrogacy and in particular, the legality of commercial surrogacy.
Moreover, complications are exacerbated where more than two states are involved; for instance if the intended parent(s) are nationals of state C but reside in state D and propose to return and * BCL (Int) (NUI); LLM (Leiden); DPhil (Oxford). ** BCL (NUI); LLM (NUI), PhD (Edinburgh). The authors would like to thank Professor Tamara Hervey and Dr James Upcher for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this piece. All errors and omissions remain the authors' own. 1 Commissioning parent(s) refers to the person(s) who have asked the surrogate to carry a child for them, with the intention that the child will be handed over after birth to their care and will be raised by the commissioning parent(s).
raise the child in state D; or where a donor egg and/or donor sperm from a national of another state is used in the creation of an embryo which is then implanted in the surrogate. The second scenario can pose difficulties in states where nationality or legal parenthood is tied to biological links as this means that the child may have no biological link with the intended parent(s), and instead have a biological link with a third party national.
Furthermore, given that many rights and responsibilities flow from the state to its nationals and this entails an economic burden for the state, states are often reluctant to recognise international surrogate children as their nationals. As a consequence, international surrogate children can be conceived of as part of one's identity which falls under one's right to a private and family life, 5 which is also flouted in such cases.
This article illustrates the relatively untapped potential of Public International Law to determine which state, if any, has the obligation to grant nationality to international surrogate children who would otherwise be stateless. This examination contributes to the existing debate on international surrogacy agreements and statelessness by taking two novel approaches. First, this article examines international surrogacy agreements through a deliberately pragmatic perspective taking as its starting point the reality that international surrogacy agreements are occurring globally and increasing in rate, and that regardless of the ethical issues surrounding such agreements, all children have the right to a nationality. Consequently, an examination of the ethical questions which surround the existence and operation of international surrogacy arrangements is beyond the scope of this article, aside from a brief reference to put this discussion in context. Second, this article represents the first legal analysis of nationality and international surrogacy agreements through a Public International Law lens. Much of the literature surrounding international surrogacy agreements has focused on the Private
International issues which for the reasons outlined in part 5, is not necessarily the best or indeed the only way to provide protection to international surrogate children. We encourage persons petitioning on behalf of stateless children to advance the arguments rooted in Public
International Law contained in this article, as such arguments tend not to be made at present. International Law seeks to address these gaps. However, the drafters of this Convention are likely to encounter significant difficulties, with the result that it is likely to take years if not decades to finalise this Convention and it is unlikely to be ratified by those states that prohibit surrogacy arrangements. As a result, we argue that the ratification and implementation in domestic law of existing Public International Law conventions providing protection for stateless children should be given priority, as this approach offers the most meaningful solution for such children in the short term. Moreover, these existing protections should be used to inform any future protections for surrogate children against statelessness under the proposed Convention.
International Surrogacy Agreements: The Current Landscape
Surrogacy involves a scenario where a woman (the surrogate) agrees to become pregnant and carry a child for another couple or individual, the intended parent(s) with the intention that after birth this child is given to the intended parent(s) to raise. This is achieved either by artificial November, 2015) which directed that India Missions/Posts/FRROs/FROs to ensure no visas would be issued to foreign nationals or permissions granted to OCIs to commission surrogacy in India. It also directed that no exit permission be given to children born through surrogacy in India to foreign nationals including OCI cardholders. However, the cases of children born through surrogacy already commissioned before the circular was issued exit permission would be decided on a case by case basis by FRROs/FROs.. This information is the based on the position at the time of writing 21
st June, 2016. foreigners availing of surrogacy services in these states. Instead of halting the practice of overseas surrogacy, such agreements may be driven underground, 20 and should foreign intended parent(s) continue to obtain surrogacy services in India/Thailand ignoring these rules, this will create further difficulties in terms of nationality for any children born who would be unable to leave the jurisdiction. These developments are most likely to result in overseas couples going to other more liberal or less regulated jurisdictions for surrogacy services. Indeed, it has been reported, that since these changes, surrogacy has been increasing in Cambodia. 21 In effect, the problems for nationality/statelessness in international surrogacy agreements are merely moved, becoming issues involving different jurisdictions than before.
International Surrogacy Agreements and the Potential for Statelessness
Two principles are crucial in terms of determining the nationality of a child at birth, namely:
jus soli; and jus sanguinis. Under jus soli or 'the right of the soil', children acquire the nationality of the territory in which they are born. Some states may also adopt limited or conditional jus soli provisions, for instance based on a residency period. 22 On the other hand, jus sanguinis, meaning 'right of the blood', is where nationality is not determined by birth but by having parents or ancestors who are nationals of that state. If the state where the child is born operates under an absolute jus soli principle the child will be a national of that state once born, and so will not be stateless. However, if the state where the child is born operates a jus sanguinis approach then the child's nationality is precarious, and will be dependent on who is
Nepal introduced a similar ban on surrogacy which included a ban for foreign nationals or arrangements initiated outside Nepal, on 18th September 2015, see http://nepal.usembassy.gov/service/surrogacy-in-nepal.html 20 It has been argued that a global ban on commercial surrogacy would likely result in a black market for surrogacy which could increase the potential for exploitation. fact that the intended father was the children's biological father. 28 However, in the Ukraine, the intended parents were seen as the children's legal parents. As Hedley J. noted, 'the children had no rights of residence in or nationality of the Ukraine and there was no obligation owed them by the state other than to accommodate them as an act of basic humanity in a state orphanage'.
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Instead, the children were 'marooned stateless and parentless whilst the applicants could neither remain in the Ukraine nor bring the children home.'
30
Nonetheless, a temporary solution was found. Following the submission of DNA evidence proving that the intended father was the biological parent of the children, discretionary leave was provided for the children to enter the UK. This was aimed at allowing the children's status to be regularised by applying for a parental order which would make the intended parents their legal parents, 31 as a result of which they could then seek UK nationality for the children under the British Nationality Act 1981. 32 The parental order which was the subject of these proceedings was subsequently granted.
The case of Baby Manji involved an Indian surrogate and Japanese intended parents. An embryo was created using the intended father's sperm and an anonymous donor's egg, which was implanted in the surrogate resulting in the birth of a baby girl. However, the intended parents' relationship broke down and the intended mother refused to participate in the surrogacy agreement. 33 When the child was born, the intended father sought to bring the child to Japan, but his application for a Japanese passport for the child was unsuccessful as under Japanese law nationality was determined on the basis of the nationality of the birth mother i.e. here, the surrogate who was Indian. 34 His application for adoption was also unsuccessful, as Indian law at the time prohibited the adoption of a female child by a single man. He then applied for an Indian passport for the baby. In order to obtain this, a birth certificate was required, and whilst under Indian law the intended father could be named on the certificate, it was unclear who the legal mother was, namely, whether it was the surrogate or the intended mother, who did not wish to be part of the arrangement. Therefore, the birth certificate was refused.
Eventually, the Indian passport office issued an identity certificate, a legal document issued to those who cannot get a passport in their discretionary solution, valid only for the baby to travel to Japan. Subsequently, the child was issued with a Japanese visa on humanitarian grounds, on which again no reference was made to the child's nationality. Once the child was in Japan, the Japanese authorities agreed that the baby could become a Japanese citizen subject to proof of the parent-child relationship.
As can be seen, the diplomatic and/or discretionary 'solutions' adopted to resolve these cases are fraught with uncertainties for intended parents and surrogate-born children. They are also often ad hoc in nature, can take considerable time to arrange, can be expensive, and can require the intended parents to stay for a considerable period of time in state A with the child(ren).
Moreover, these are often temporary solutions provided to allow the child to travel to state B with the intended parents, but (most importantly for the purposes of this article) they do not necessarily resolve the nationality status of the child, which may involve further processes after the child is in state B. These 'solutions' are also of little practical benefit to children abandoned by intended parents following an international surrogacy agreement who are left in a highly precarious position under this current framework, as in many cases the temporary solutions 34 Charles Kindregan and Danielle White, 'International Fertility Tourism: The Potential for Stateless children in cross-border commercial surrogacy arrangements' (2013) Suffolk Transnational Law Review 527-626, 548.
described must be petitioned for through the legal system in either/both states. Without the intended parent(s) involved, it is questionable who will apply for such rights on behalf of the surrogate child. Moreover, even if the child has a surrogate willing to petition on his/her behalf, the reality is the surrogate may not have the resources or means to access the legal services necessary to do so. 35 Furthermore, as it is the child's nationality which is in issue in such cases, there is no recognisable state which will step in for their protection.
For these reasons, we argue that the current framework surrounding the nationality of surrogate children does not sufficiently safeguard children against statelessness. Recourse to Public
International Law is warranted as, although it has its limitations, it nonetheless goes some way to safeguard human rights for such children.
International Protection of Stateless Children born under International Surrogacy Agreements
The literature on International Surrogacy Agreements has taken a Private International Law approach, 36 which implies complete state sovereignty over nationality. The key argument we are making is that existing provisions of Public International Law offer protection to children born stateless as a result of international surrogacy agreements. In becoming parties to particular treaties, states have consented to be bound to certain provisions that limit their powers in determining nationality. In the words of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: 35 There will be exceptions to this, such as the case of Baby Gammy whose Thai surrogate decided to raise him after the commissioning parents refused to. Subsequently, she successfully petitioned -amidst much international media coverage -on behalf of the child for Nonetheless, the provision suffers from significant procedural hurdles. Article 1 may be subject to the condition that the child has been habitually resident in the Contracting State for such period as may be fixed by that state, not exceeding five years immediately preceding the lodging of the application nor ten years in total. 42 Unless a state adopts a zero days residency period, a child who has just been born will not fulfil residency requirements where such requirements are applicable, and thus not be entitled to nationality of the state in which he or she was born.
For those children, Article 4 provides a 'safety net' in the sense that he or she would be entitled to the nationality of one of his parents, provided one of his parents was from a Contracting
State. This, once again, may be subject to a residency period of up to three years preceding the lodging of the application for nationality. However, a further significant problem that may arise is where the parent(s) of the child do not lodge an application for nationality. 43 This could happen where the parent(s) decide they no longer want to raise the child. In such a case, it is unclear whether the child would remain stateless and much would depend on who was to become the guardian of the child.
Thus the general position under the CRS is that a child will be given the nationality of the state in which s/he was born unless the child does not fulfil residency requirements set out by that state (where applicable), in which case the child will be entitled to the nationality of one of his/her parents. The exhaustive nature of the list of possible requirements means that states cannot establish conditions for the grant of nationality additional to those stipulated in the CRS.
However, problems remain. First, similar to the issues raised in the first half of this article (where it was noted that difficulties in terms of nationality often revolve around the definition of parentage for this purpose), the meaning of 'parent' under the CRS is also unclear: does it mean the biological parent or birth mother? At the time of the CRS' drafting in 1961 -before the advent of assisted reproductive technologies -the birth mother and biological parent were synonymous concepts, 44 so it is unclear whether the CRS can accommodate children born by surrogacy. However, we argue that a modern-day understanding of the term 'parent' could be applied, in line with the object and purpose of the treaty, 45 which is to reduce statelessness, 46 and the evolutionary approach to treaty interpretation, which provides that the meaning of a term in a treaty is capable of changing over time. . During the course of drafting, the original proposal of Article 24(3) provided that 'The child shall be entitled from his birth to … a nationality.' During the ensuing debate, the word 'acquire' was inserted and the words 'from his birth' were deleted. According to Detrick, these amendments were made because the majority felt that a state could not assume an unqualified obligation to afford its nationality to every child born on its territory regardless of the circumstances. 53 Article 3 provides that in all actions concerning children, the 'best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.' Such actions would of course include applications on behalf of a child for the granting of nationality. More specific to the problem identified by this article, Article 7
provides that:
'The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents. Read in conjunction with Article 2 (which provides that it is the state in whose jurisdiction the child is has the obligation to implement the CRC), the obligation in Article 7 is thus primarily addressed to the state in which the child is born. However, as the right is 'to acquire' a nationality, the same considerations regarding Article 24 of the ICCPR apply, that is, that there may be an element of state discretion involved in the bestowal of nationality. It is difficult to reconcile this with the words 'shall ensure' in the second part of Article 3, which entail an obligation of result. 61 This means that the state in which the child is born must successfully implement the right to acquire a nationality. The CRC does not specifically say the nationality granted should be the nationality of that state specifically; however we argue that in line with the object and purpose of the treaty (which is to protect the rights of the child), 62 and the principle of effectiveness, 63 that the State Party in which the child is born has at the very least an obligation to grant nationality where the child would otherwise be rendered stateless.
In addition, Article 8 of the CRC provides that the State Party has a continuing obligation to preserve the child's identity, which includes their nationality, name, and family relations and Article 9 provides that as a general rule, a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will. Thus where a child is awaiting determination of nationality, it can be argued that the state has an obligation not to expel his or her parent(s). This is supported by Article 10, manner; and Article 3, which provides that the best interests of the child are paramount. Clearly, being accompanied by their intended parents in the best interests of a newborn child. However, similar to the CRS, the term 'parent' is undefined by the CRC.
Finally, it should be noted that Optional Protocol III to the CRC, which provides for an individual complaints mechanism, 64 entered into force in April 2014. 65 It currently has 26 States Parties, although the Committee has yet to deliver its views on any complaint received.
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) does not explicitly refer to nationality rights. 66 However, Article 8(1) provides that 'everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life'. The relationship between this article and international surrogacy agreements was examined in the recent cases of Labassee v. France and Menneson v. France. 67 Both cases concerned a husband and wife who conducted surrogacy arrangements in the USA using the gametes of the husband and an egg from the surrogate. The cases examined the refusal of the French authorities to legally recognise the family tie between a child, his biological father, and his intended mother; and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decided that the proceedings should be considered simultaneously. 68 In its judgment, the ECtHR said that a distinction was to be drawn between: (i) the applicants' right to respect for their family life; and
(ii) the right of the children to respect for their private life. Regarding point (i), the ECtHR decided that because the children were not prevented from living in France and because of the doctrine of margin of appreciation, 69 a fair balance had been struck between the interests of the parents and those of the state. Regarding point (ii), the ECtHR said that although the ECHR does not grant a right to nationality, nationality is an element of a person's identity and it has consequences for the enjoyment of other rights, in particular for inheritance rights. The ECtHR accepted that France may wish to deter its nationals from going abroad to undertake surrogacy agreements, but the effects of non-recognition of the children's relationship with a parent affects the children, whose right to private life was substantially affected. The ECtHR therefore held in both cases that France's refusal to legally recognise both families constituted a violation of right to private life under Article 8 ECHR.
To draw this decision back to the question posed in this article, it appears that the ECtHR was willing to interpret Article 8 of the Convention broadly to find an obligation to recognise a family link between the intended mother, biological father, and a child born outside a
Contracting State by an international surrogacy agreement. In future cases, this decision may be relevant for establishing nationality, particularly given the reference in the case to nationality forming part of a person's identity. Indeed, there is some evidence of the influence of this reasoning in recent domestic cases relating to surrogacy especially in states which previously adopted a restrictive approach. 70 The HCCH has stated that Mennesson and Labasse has had an impact, and argue that a trend can, albeit cautiously, be discerned in recent cases in favour of the broader recognition of legal parentage following international surrogacy agreements under certain conditions. 71 However, a notable feature of Mennesson and Labasse was that these children were present on French territory, which triggered France's obligation in this regard. Had the children concerned never entered France, the ECHR would not apply. This is because
Article 1 ECHR provides that it will only apply to persons within the jurisdiction of the States Parties, 72 and it is only in exceptional circumstances that a decision of a state that has extraterritorial effects can be held as a violation of the ECHR. 73 Thus in order for Article 8 -and by extension, the above case-law -to be applicable, the child concerned would need to be present in Council of Europe member state to rely on the ECHR. 74 As aforementioned, one of the first problems a stateless child often faces is entering the state of his intended parents, thus it is unclear how much assistance this case will give in practical terms as ipso facto, children born by virtue of international surrogacy agreements are born outside of the state of nationality and/or residence of their intended parents.
The decisions of Labassee and Mennesson were followed by the decision of Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy in 2015. 75 In this case, Italy refused to transcribe the birth certificate of a child born to a surrogate in Russia. When it emerged that the intended father had no genetic link with the child (contrary to the information that the intended parents had provided the authorities), the applicants were charged with distorting the civil state, forging, and violating the law on adoption. The child was subsequently placed in care and the applicants were found to no longer have standing in the adoption proceedings.
The ECtHR ruled that the applicants could not act on behalf of the child, who had a guardian since October 2011. However, the ECtHR held that the decision to separate the child from the intended parents amounted to a violation of the parents' right to family life as protected by 
Is a New Convention the Best Solution?
Most of the literature to date on international surrogacy agreements identify the problems that arise by virtue of these agreements and generally agrees with the position of the HCCH that a new convention regulating international surrogacy agreements is necessary. 77 However, a new convention will simply not solve the problems outlined by this article. Any attempt to achieve a global consensus on the regulation of surrogacy, such as in the form of an international convention 'must necessarily be informed by detailed ethnographic research that elucidates the complex lived experience of clinical labour in situ' 83 and would need to '
attend to the question of how power relations within the neoliberal economy are shaped by longer histories of unevenness and geopolitical and social in equality'. 84 Finally, no matter how comprehensive the negotiation process is, there will inevitably be cases that will fall outside the parameters of the convention. For these reasons, we argue that a realistic approach should be taken as to when and if a convention will ever enter into force and it needs to be borne in mind that a convention will not prevent all instances of statelessness from surrogacy arising.
In the meantime, it is equally, if not more important to focus on existing binding provisions that regulate the bestowal of nationality for children born stateless pursuant to international surrogacy agreements. This is because states cannot use provisions of its domestic laws as an excuse for failing to carry out its international treaty obligations. 85 The CRC, which is the most widely-ratified international treaty, offers the most comprehensive protection in this respect, particularly when the provisions on nationality and the principle of the 'best interests of the child' are read in conjunction with each other. Moreover, increasing the number of States transcribe Indian birth certificates of children born through international surrogacy agreements.) 89 Given the broad approach that the Court took in Paradiso, it is likely that the ECtHR will find a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR in the above cases. It remains to be seen whether the ECtHR will use the principles of Public International Law as highlighted in this article to inform its rulings.
We also argue that lawyers should be encouraged to make Public International Law arguments in domestic cases, while being mindful of the limits of those arguments as outlined above. For states such as the Netherlands that have a monist legal system, international law is directly applicable in the domestic legal system and thus the arguments canvassed in this article are similarly directly applicable in a domestic court. 90 For states such as the United Kingdom that operate a dualist legal system, the national legislature must 'transform' the international obligation into a rule of national law, and the national judge will then apply it as a rule of domestic law. 91 However, a domestic judge should interpret that domestic rule in accordance with its original source as an international instrument. This point also suggests that the best guide to the meaning of the words used in the Convention is likely to be found by giving them a broad meaning in the light of the purposes which the Convention was designed to serve.' 93 Finally, we agree with the argument put forward by Ergas that the drafting of any new convention should be informed by existing human rights obligations. 94 The ECJ held that human rights law limits Member States' domestic conduct and the scope of their international agreements. 95 Similarly, the ICJ has held that even where a particular lex specialis applies, its provisions are to be interpreted in view of human rights law, 96 and human rights norms continue to apply unless they have been specifically suspended. 97 Indeed, as aforementioned, the obligation to take into account international law was explicitly stated in the ECtHR decision of
Campenelli, which dealt with the issue of international surrogacy agreements. Thus, it would in fact be a breach of international law for a state to carry out obligations under a new convention that conflicted with its existing human rights obligations and therefore the proposed convention would need to be in conformity with its existing obligations. We advocate in particular for the inclusion of those set out in the CRC as most states in the world are a party to that Convention.
Conclusion
As identified above, the numbers of international surrogacy agreements are on the increase globally. With no international legal framework and significant disparities amongst national laws, children born as a result of international surrogacy agreements are in a precarious position.
In such circumstances, as seen above, states have generally sought to achieve a temporary resolution but these solutions are often ad hoc in nature and can take considerable time and money to arrange.
It is simply not satisfactory, given the general agreement internationally on the need to end statelessness, that children, who are one of the most vulnerable groups in society, and whose human rights and dignity must therefore be given the utmost legal protection, are born under the shadow of 'statelessness' with all the attendant risks this position entails. proposed Hague Convention on Surrogacy, if completed, will address such issues, it is likely that it will take considerable time to conclude and that states that ban commercial surrogacy will be reluctant to participate. A better solution to the problems faced by international surrogacy agreement children is found in the provisions governing statelessness in Public
International Law. These provisions -particularly those contained in the CRC and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR-offer protection to international surrogacy agreement children and such provisions should be relied upon to interpret domestic legal provisions in litigation relating to international surrogacy agreements. Finally, the drafting of any new convention should be informed by existing international law obligations; particularly those set out in the CRC, which is the most widely-ratified treaty in the world.
